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Things that We Would Like to Take for Granted:
Minimum Standards for the Legal Framework
of a Free and Democratic Society
±
Joseph W. Singer*
In his satirical novel Jennifer Government, Max Barry describes a liber-
tarian dystopia where deregulation has run amok.1  In Barry’s frightening
portrait of the near future, the government has been privatized and people
get the police protection for which they are willing and able to pay.  Written
contracts are enforced to the letter—no matter what they say.  There are no
limits on freedom of contract, and contracting parties are free to hire either
private or public agents to enforce the terms of those contracts.
The book begins when the hero signs an employment contract without read-
ing it.   That contract was dreamed up by the marketing department of his
company, which believes that the company could sell more sneakers if con-
sumers thought the sneakers were so cool that people were willing to kill—
literally—to get a pair.  The marketers drum up demand for the sneakers but
severely limit the supply until their potential customers are chomping at the
bit.  They then dupe the hapless hero into signing a contract that requires
him to kill a few customers to increase demand for the shoes even further.
Because our hero has already signed the contract, he is bound by its penal-
ties if he fails to perform—penalties so severe that they make Shylock look
generous by comparison.
Although in Barry’s parallel universe killing is technically illegal, en-
forcement occurs only through private initiative, depending on private de-
mand.   Moreover, the company would only have to pay a fine for breaking
this law.  This of course promotes efficiency; the law against murder should
be broken if the company is willing to pay more to violate it than the costs of
enforcing it.  The hero also can get help from the police to protect him from
contract enforcement by the company if he is willing and able to pay enough
to induce them to refuse to enforce the contract.  The police will aid the
family of a murder victim in finding the murderer only if the family is will-
ing and able to hire them to do so.  The marketers of course choose poor
victims to kill; their families will be no threat because they cannot afford
police protection.   At the climax of the novel, the marketing director issues
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a declaration of independence, freeing the corporation from the evil bonds of
government dictatorship.   Economic competition slides inexorably into mil-
itary conflict.
It is all an implausible romp, I suppose, but Barry’s novel is meant to
prove a point: freedom without law is not liberty, and the free market with-
out a legal structure is not a market in any sense we would recognize.  This
means that liberty is not possible without regulation; paradoxically, the lib-
erty we experience in the private sphere is only possible because of the regu-
lation we impose in the public sphere.   Indeed, it is fair to say that when we
talk about liberty, we are talking about the benefits of living within a just
regulatory structure.
How you react to this statement says a lot about you.  Some of you may
find the idea that there is no liberty without law to be an obvious truism.
Even a minimal libertarian state would have laws against assault and theft
and rules about the distribution of property.2  On the other hand, some of you
might be thinking: I know where this is going—he is one of those liberals
who does not believe in the free market; after all, people who defend regula-
tion are generally big-government types, hell-bent on paternalistic meddling
with private choices.   Viewed in this way, any defense of regulation is an
attack on traditional American liberties.
I find this polarity interesting.  Most people would agree that a free
society needs law, but when I claim that there is no liberty without regula-
tion, many people are quick to object; they find that formulation jarring or
even nonsensical.  People seem to like the idea of law but they shudder at
the idea of being regulated.  If people like law and hate regulation, they are
either making a subtle distinction or they are confused.  Maybe when we
think of law we are thinking about the security it provides us and we are
happy about that; but when we think of regulation, we are thinking about the
ways it limits our freedom of action, and that gets us riled up.  The problem
of course is that we only get security by limiting freedom of action.  If we
think we can get the benefits of law without the costs of regulation, then we
are deluding ourselves.
The observation that liberty requires regulation is neither trivial nor rad-
ical.  It is, however, an insight that is both important and very easy to forget.
Consider the way we frame legal questions about the market.   When we
imagine ways to respond to social problems, we tend to distinguish “market
solutions” from “regulatory solutions.”3  We ask: “When should the law
interfere with the free market?” or “Why limit freedom of contract?”
2 RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (Clar-
endon Press 2000) (1998).
3 See, e.g., Charles H. Koch, Jr, Collaborative Governance in the Restructured Electricity
Industry, 40 WAKE F OREST L. REV. 589, 593 (2005); Peter B. Rutledge, Market Solutions to
Market Problems: Re-Examining Arbitral Immunity as a Solution to Unfairness in Securities
Arbitration, 26 PACE L. REV. 113 (2005) (both distinguishing between “market solutions” and
“regulatory solutions”). But see Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought:
Essays on the Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 939 (1985) (criticizing this
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When we frame our questions this way, we characterize regulations as
constraints on liberty.  If we define liberty as negative liberty or complete
freedom from any external constraint, then there are no apparent limits on
the kinds of arrangements that are socially acceptable.  This seems attractive
only if you do not think about it too deeply, and Thomas Hobbes explained
why: without law we have the war of all against all and that makes life
“solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”4  In reality, states that lack the
effective rule of law are not paradises; rather, they are war zones like Iraq
and Somalia.  For the concept of liberty to be meaningful it must include the
idea that we do not live alone and that if we are living with and among other
people, we need regulations designed to ensure peace and tranquility.  In
other words, the liberty we care about includes just laws.
The legal realists5 taught us that this truth also applies to the market.
The free market is not the war of all against all; it is a zone of social life
structured by law.  The free market operates against a backdrop of regula-
tion—regulations we too often take for granted.  Indeed, the legal realists
taught us that the market simply is a regulatory structure.  Our regulations,
both statutory and common law, shape the house that we live in, and the
liberty that we value comes from having built that house and the environ-
ment around it.  And, as Barry’s book shows, the character of those back-
ground regulations matters enormously; they determine the shape of our
social world and the character of our economic relationships.
Viewed this way, our aversion to the regulatory state looks less and less
rational.  We talk about regulating the market as if every regulation reduces
our freedom.  We do this despite the fact that our actual, working conception
of freedom includes the benefits of regulation.  What I want to know is
whether there is a way to frame the way we talk about market regulation in a
manner that acknowledges the legal realist insight that regulation often pro-
motes liberty.  I hope that the answer is yes.
I want to make three points in this Essay.  First, we should reframe the
way we think about the relation between liberty and regulation in a manner
that is better attuned to the values we actually hold as a society.  Instead of
assuming that all regulations limit liberty, we should recognize that all con-
tracts are subject to regulations that set minimum standards for economic
4 THOMAS H OBBES, THE L EVIATHAN 186 (C B. MacPherson ed., Penguin Books 1968)
(1651).
5 The legal realists were scholars who wrote in the first half of the twentieth century and
who argued that laws promote social policy, protect competing interests, and cannot be derived
by logical deduction from abstract concepts. See, e.g., Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense
and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935).   Importantly for our purposes
here, they also criticized the Supreme Court for striking down labor legislation on the ground
that it interfered with “freedom of contract.” They argued that markets are defined by law and
that the institutions of property and contract cannot exist without government regulation. See,
e.g., Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933); Morris R. Cohen,
Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8 (1927); Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress,
and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943).\\server05\productn\H\HLP\2-1\HLP209.txt unknown Seq: 4 25-JAN-08 10:46
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and social relationships.  The question then is what those minimum stan-
dards should be.
Second, although some minimum-standards regulations merely set rules
of the road, other regulations do and should do much more; they define the
contours of our way of life.
Third, our way of life is not adequately captured by the idea of the free
market.  Our conception of the free market is embedded in a larger and more
fundamental idea of a “free and democratic society.”6  For this reason, to
define minimum standards regulations in a manner that is consistent with
settled social values, we cannot define liberty as mere preference satisfac-
tion.  Rather than asking only what contract the parties actually made or
what contract they would have made if they had perfect information and
faced no transaction costs, we should ask the question suggested by John
Rawls: What contract would the parties have made if they did not know on
which side of the bargaining table they would be sitting? This question gets
us closer to reasoning appropriately in setting the minimum standards for the
legal framework of a free and democratic society.
I. ANTI ANTI-PATERNALISM AND MINIMUM STANDARDS
How do we frame legal issues to recognize the contribution that regula-
tion makes to liberty?  The answer, of course, lies in property law.7  But
what lessons does property law offer?
To answer that question, let us begin with the model I want to criticize.
We can call it the “free market” model.  In this paradigm, people obtain
property through just procedures and are free to use it as they wish or trans-
fer it to others.  They are also free to make contracts with others on terms of
their own choosing.  Freedom to control one’s own property and to enter
agreements with others promotes both autonomy and efficiency.  It promotes
autonomy because individuals are empowered to choose their own ends and
the terms of their association with others; it promotes efficiency because free
transferability of property ensures that resources will end up in the hands of
the person who values them the most, while free contracting allows the par-
ties to reach mutually advantageous arrangements, thereby increasing their
welfare.  For these reasons, under the free market model, limitations on free
use or transfer of property and limits on the freedom to contract on terms of
one’s choosing constitute prima facie deprivations of liberty that decrease
both individual and social well-being and thus bear a heavy burden of
justification.
Mandatory terms in contracts are especially suspect in the free market
model for two different reasons.  First, they pose efficiency problems be-
6 I am borrowing this term from the Canadian Constitution.
7 Like all teachers, I think the subject I teach is the most important and fundamental one
there is.\\server05\productn\H\HLP\2-1\HLP209.txt unknown Seq: 5 25-JAN-08 10:46
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cause they prevent the parties from entering exchanges that make all parties
to the deal better off on their own terms.  By requiring contracts to contain
particular terms, regulations directly harm parties who feel they would be
better off with different terms.  They also induce contracting parties who do
not want those terms to react by bargaining about other terms, increasing the
cost charged for services or providing or buying fewer services—all of
which may make one or more parties worse off in their own terms than they
would be in the absence of the regulation.  By interfering with the terms that
the parties would have agreed to in the absence of regulation, the regulation
reduces the joint welfare of the parties.  For this reason, mandatory terms
should only exist to prevent the contracting parties from imposing severe
negative externalities on third parties when transaction costs prevent those
third parties from protecting their interests by affecting the terms of the con-
tract that harm them.  Even then, limitations on freedom of contract are only
justified if we are sure that the overall social harm caused by the contract
terms at issue outweighs its overall social benefit.
Second, mandatory terms interfere with autonomy by preventing the
parties from “doing as well as they can, given their circumstances, in the
realm of contractual choice.”8  Under the theory of liberty championed by
John Stuart Mill, individuals are best suited to determine what is in their own
interest; it is a violation of autonomy for courts or legislatures to act pater-
nalistically to protect individuals from their own mistakes on the ground that
these government officials know better than individuals what is in their best
interest.9  The ability of individuals to choose their own ends and to deter-
mine the course of their own lives is fundamental to liberty.10
The free market model sees the market as a free-standing area of social
life characterized by free choices of individual market participants.  Regula-
tions are built on top of the market and are thought to restrict it or interfere
with it.  This paradigm of the free market contains important truths because
the freedoms that it describes are important freedoms; however, it is incom-
plete and misleading.  It fails to describe adequately the fact that the market
is a zone of social life structured by law, it fails to describe adequately ex-
isting law or values, and it exaggerates the extent to which we actually de-
sire real contractual freedom.
8 Alan Schwartz, Justice and the Law of Contracts: A Case for the Traditional Approach,
9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 107, 115 (1986).   This article is in many ways a response to
Schwartz’s very clear presentation of the classical argument against mandatory terms in
contracts.
9 JOHN S TUART M ILL, ON L IBERTY (Gertrude Himmelfarb, ed., Penguin Books 1974)
(1859).
10 We might also justify mandatory terms by arguing that they represent the terms the
parties would have chosen if they had had perfect information.   While this move is common-
place among efficiency proponents, libertarians find it suspect because it requires confidence
that we know what the parties would have done in this counterfactual situation; this again
raises the specter of paternalism by substituting the judgment of a social engineer for that of
the parties.\\server05\productn\H\HLP\2-1\HLP209.txt unknown Seq: 6 25-JAN-08 10:46
144 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 2
By way of contrast, consider the estates system model found in a first-
year property law course.  The estates system defines a dozen ways to divide
up interests in land.  When particular rights are transferred from one person
to another, the estates system requires a set of other rights to go along for the
ride, defining a few bundles of rights that owners can create.  In effect, these
rules impose mandatory terms in real estate contracts.  For example, re-
straints on alienation of fee simple interests are usually void, as are cove-
nants restricting occupancy of land by race or religion today.  Similarly, we
do not allow owners to create landlocked parcels: if you sell your backyard
you must grant the new owner an easement to go across your remaining land
to get to a public road.  The core policy underlying the estates system is not
freedom of contract but the promotion of alienability.  Traditionally, this has
meant increasing the marketability of land by preventing owners from creat-
ing certain kinds of encumbrances on ownership such as future interests and
covenants.  Property law consolidates powers over land in current owners,
freeing them to use their property as they wish without restrictions imposed
by prior owners.  Historically, this policy effectively took power away from
feudal lords and pushed it downwards to give it to those who lived on the
land.
Alienability thus promoted freehold ownership and prevented enforce-
ment of arrangements that could lead to the reemergence of feudalism.  Full
control over land was thought to increase the autonomy of owners, while the
absence of restrictions on land use promoted its free use and efficient trans-
fer to others.  In addition, making land transferable made it subject to market
forces and thus played a role in dispersing ownership of land among many
people rather than leaving ownership concentrated in the hands of a few
aristocratic families.  Land use restrictions may initially serve the interests of
those who create them, but over time, their utility may diminish.  In addi-
tion, transaction costs may inhibit those who would benefit from getting rid
of such restrictions from contracting with owners of the restricted property
to remove them.  If all of this is correct, the policy of promoting alienability
actually has democratizing effects: it prevents oppression, encourages mobil-
ity, ensures freedom, protects both efficiency and equality, and generates
widespread dispersal of ownership.
But this means there is an important tension between the free market
model concept of “freedom of contract” and the property law concept of
“ownership.”  Property law restricts the ability of owners to divide up prop-
erty rights in ways that lead to the undue concentration of ownership or
encumber real estate with socially undesirable limitations on use or transfer.
We do this to protect the autonomy of current owners and to promote equal
access to land ownership. Property law achieves these goals by limiting free-
dom of contract.  Here is the paradox: The more absolute the use rights of
current owners, the more restrictions on freedom of contract society must
impose.\\server05\productn\H\HLP\2-1\HLP209.txt unknown Seq: 7 25-JAN-08 10:46
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Here is a second version of the paradox.  The Civil Rights Act of 1866
grants all persons the “same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is
enjoyed by white citizens.”11  To grant individuals the same right to contract
as is enjoyed by white citizens, the Supreme Court has placed a duty on
retail stores to sell goods to customers regardless of their race.  The cus-
tomer’s right to contract is protected by imposing a duty to contract on the
store.  This seems to violate freedom of contract norms; ordinarily, free con-
tract means you get to choose whether to contract with someone or not.  But
the Civil Rights Act has been interpreted to require stores to enter contracts
with customers if the only reason for the refusal to contract is the race of the
customer.  The right to contract of the patron limits the freedom of contract
of the store owner.
The patron’s right to contract is also a right to buy the goods offered by
the store; this protects the patron’s right to become an owner of the shirts
sold in the store.  However, the law protects the right to acquire property by
denying the store owner the freedom not to sell the shirts.  Again, society
limits freedom of contract in order to enable individuals to become owners
and to enjoy equal access to the market economy.
The concept of “freedom of contract” certainly appears to be in some
tension with the concept of “ownership.”  Worse still, both concepts appear
to be in tension with themselves: the right to contract is enforced by impos-
ing a duty to contract; thus, freedom of contract is promoted by limiting
freedom of contract.  The right to acquire property is enforced by imposing a
duty to sell; thus, property rights are promoted by limiting property rights.
What all this means is that contractual freedom promotes both liberty and
equality only if it occurs within boundaries set by law.
This further shows that the free market model itself may contain inter-
nal tensions.  It suggests that while mandatory terms may be inefficient be-
cause they prevent the parties from agreeing to mutually beneficial terms,
inefficiencies may also emerge when the parties impose restrictions on land
use whose utility diminishes over time or that result in externalities on others
when transaction costs prevent those harmed from contracting to remove
them.  The free market model also suggests that government regulations nec-
essarily inhibit liberty by paternalistically substituting the government’s
judgment about what is in the best interest of the parties for that of the
parties themselves.  But property law suggests that the law may impose
mandatory terms in contracts—not because the lawmakers think they know
better than the contracting parties what is in their best interests, but because
such regulations are the only way to create the arrangements that the parties
themselves want.
For example, suppose a developer of a residential subdivision wants to
assure home buyers that their homes will be located among other homes,
rather than next to a gas station or a funeral parlor.  How can the owner
11 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000).\\server05\productn\H\HLP\2-1\HLP209.txt unknown Seq: 8 25-JAN-08 10:46
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assure buyers that this will be the case?  One way is to get a zoning law
passed that restricts property in the neighborhood to residential uses of the
contemplated sort.  Another is to place restrictions on all the parcels that
limit land use to residential purposes.  Today, one can create such restric-
tions by filing a “declaration” in the registry of deeds that contains those
land use restrictions, placing all buyers of land in the area on notice before
they purchase.  What happens if an owner sells her property to a subsequent
purchaser by transferring a deed that contains no restrictions?
The buyer may argue that she bought an unrestricted lot and that restric-
tions to which prior owners of the lot agreed cannot bind her in the absence
of an express promise that she also will abide by them.  The neighbors may
argue that the initial buyer not only agreed to the restrictions but promised
not to sell the property free of the restrictions.  The new owner can reply,
“Fine, sue her for damages.  But you cannot get injunctive relief against me
to force me to comply with restrictions I never agreed to in the first place.”
But if this were the case, a subsequent owner might offer an existing owner
enough money to pay off any such damages.  One might think this was an
example of efficient breach, but the effect is to substitute a liability rule
(damages) for a property rule (the right not to sell or to sell at a price chosen
by the owner of the entitlement).12
If damages are awarded against the initial contracting promisor, the cost
of breaking the restriction is the fair market value rather than the asking
price of the neighbors, and the new buyer may avoid the restriction without
the consent of the neighbors.  If this were the law, then the developer could
not assure the initial buyers that they would not face the possibility of non-
residential uses next door.
If we want to create this particular type of property right—a house lo-
cated in a neighborhood with other houses and no nonresidential uses unless
all affected owners unanimously consent to those uses—then we must adopt
regulatory rules that allow property rights to be bundled this way.  This, in
turn, requires imposing such regulations on future buyers whether or not
they make a similar express promise; the law declares that anyone who buys
a restricted lot, and is on notice of the restrictions, will be deemed to have
agreed to those restrictions, regardless of what her contract says.  In this
case, we promote freedom of contract (the ability to contract to create this
package of property rights) by limiting freedom of contract (preventing own-
ers from selling property free of the restrictions).
12 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Ina-
lienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).   Liability rules protect
entitlements by awarding damages in court, usually measured by the fair market value of the
entitlement.   Property rules either deny relief or grant injunctive relief ordering a harm not to
be committed without the owner’s consent; this allows a transaction to occur at a price agreed
to by the owner of the entitlement rather than at a price set by the court.   The fair market value
of entitlements is often much lower than the owner’s asking price.\\server05\productn\H\HLP\2-1\HLP209.txt unknown Seq: 9 25-JAN-08 10:46
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Similarly, if we want to ensure that people can enter the market system
without regard to race, we must regulate service providers to prevent them
from refusing to contract on the basis of race.  This limits freedom of con-
tract but it does so to ensure the ability to acquire property regardless of
one’s race.  This property right simply cannot be created in the absence of a
mandatory rule regulating the market conduct of public accommodations.
The free market model conceptualizes mandatory rules as interferences
with freedom of contract and, hence, limitations on autonomy.  But if these
rules help the parties get what they want—and if the parties cannot get what
they want without those regulations—then it makes no sense to characterize
those rules as necessarily liberty-inhibiting; rather, although they limit free-
dom of action, they appear to be liberty-enhancing.  Similarly, such regula-
tions do not substitute the government’s judgment of what is in the best
interests of the parties for the judgment of the parties themselves.  Rather,
market participants demand these regulations in order to create a legal
framework that enables them to get what they want.
This point is dramatically evident in our statutory law.  If you look at
the statutes that exist in state law books, you find an interesting thing: even
the most libertarian states have hundreds of regulations, most of which are
designed to protect the public in various ways.  I asked my research assistant
to look up the statutes in Idaho—surely one of our most libertarian states.
Here is what he found: Idaho regulates building contractors13 and doctors14
for competence, building construction for safety,15 and banks and insurance
companies for solvency.16  Idaho requires corporate disclosures to permit ra-
tional investment decisions.17  Idaho’s antitrust laws prevent undue concen-
tration of ownership in particular markets18 and its consumer protection laws
defend, consumer safety.19  Idaho regulates entrance and exit from family
13 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 39-4001 to -4004, 39-4010 to -4011 (2006) (granting
the Division of Building Safety broad authority over building construction in Idaho).  Among
the other areas regulated by the Division of Building Safety are electricians, plumbers, heating
and air conditioning installers, and loggers. See Idaho Division of Building Safety Home
Page, http://dbs.idaho.gov.
14 See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-1808 (2006); see also IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 39-1301 to -
1310 (2006).
15 See id. §§ 39-4001 to -4004, 39-4010 to -4011 (2006).
16 See id. § 41-1402 (2006) (“The purpose of this chapter is to promote the public welfare
by regulating insurance rates as herein provided to the end that they shall not be excessive,
inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory, and to authorize and regulate cooperative action among
insurers in rate making. . . .”); See also § 26-601 (2006) (regulating bank reserves).
17 See id. §§ 30-1-1601 to -1605, 30-1-1620 to -1621 (2006).  These state regulations, as
with many other state regulations in this and almost every other area, are in addition to already
plentiful federal regulation.
18 Id. §§ 48-101 to -118 (2006) (regulating monopolies and other types of business prac-
tices in order to “maintain and promote economic competition in Idaho commerce, to provide
the benefits of that competition to consumers and businesses in the state, and to establish
efficient and economical procedures to accomplish these purposes and policies.”
19 See, e.g., id. §§ 37-123 to -131 (2006).  This state regulation supplements extensive
federal regulation of consumer products, especially food and drugs.\\server05\productn\H\HLP\2-1\HLP209.txt unknown Seq: 10 25-JAN-08 10:46
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relationships and related duties of support,20 it regulates inheritance and pre-
vents anyone from completely disinheriting a spouse,21 and it regulates
worker safety, including safety from discrimination and harassment.22  Idaho
forbids discrimination in the housing market based on race, sex, disability
and religion.23  Idaho imposes zoning and environmental regulations.24  In-
deed, all these regulations exist in a relatively libertarian state.
Do these extensive regulations prevent parties from getting what they
want, or do they help parties get what they want?  If we conceptualize free-
dom as negative liberty, then these regulations seem to limit freedom of
contract and prevent parties who would like to contract around these terms
from choosing how to manage their own affairs.  But if this is so, why are
such regulations so prevalent?  We have such laws because people demand
them as a way to respond to social problems.  When miners recently died in
West Virginia, the general reaction was that there was a need for greater
government regulation of safety conditions in the mines—not that the min-
ers died because expensive government regulation had usurped the time and
money of the company, forcing it to spend its resources on filling out useless
forms rather than paying for oxygen tanks.25
Some argue that legislation is inefficient because people imagine that
they can get the benefits of regulation without paying the costs.  They claim
that if the miners and the company were to bargain about safety, the efficient
level of safety would be provided; the bargaining process forces the miners
to consider the costs of added safety, either in reduced salary or fewer jobs,
thus resulting in efficient balancing of costs and benefits.  The legislative
process, they argue, does not generate a similar level of awareness of what
must be given up to attain a higher safety level.  If those claims are true, then
the market process is better at assessing “what the parties want” than the
legislative process.
The problem with this argument is that it ignores the ways in which the
market process itself is biased.  The market does not adequately reflect the
interests of third parties or of society as a whole who bear the negative exter-
nalities of market transactions and who are barred from participating in those
transactions because of obvious impediments to transacting.  Moreover, even
20 See, e.g., id. § 32-1201 (2006) (mandating withholding of child support payments based
on legislative determination that state’s child support regulations were not being followed suf-
ficiently without mandatory employer participation through  withholding salary).
21 See, e.g., id. § 15-2-102 (2006) (establishing intestate share of surviving spouse).
22 See id. § 18-7301 (2006).
23 See id. § 67-5909(8) (2006).
24  See, e.g., id. §§ 38-101 to -136 (2006) (establishing extensive regulations and a govern-
ment agency to protect the state’s forests); §§ 47-1501 to -1519 (2006) (extending state’s de-
tailed regulation of mining to surface mining and detailing the duties and powers of the Board
of Land Commissioners).
25 See, e.g., Ken Ward Jr., $10 Million Sought for Mine Inspections; Byrd Says MSHA
Needs More Help With New Reforms, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (W.   Va.), Oct. 19, 2007, at 9A
(reporting that Senator Byrd sought more funding for mine inspections after several well-
publicized mine disasters”).\\server05\productn\H\HLP\2-1\HLP209.txt unknown Seq: 11 25-JAN-08 10:46
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if it is true that the legislative process is biased against recognizing the costs
of regulation, the market process is biased against recognizing minimum
standards for market transactions and against internalizing externalities.
When one is asked to accept lower wages for higher safety levels, there is a
tendency to think only of the short term, discounting both the possibility of
injury and the benefits of increased protection.  In contrast, the political pro-
cess is arguably better suited to set minimum standards for market transac-
tions; politics generates arguments about our most fundamental values and
may therefore encourage a long-term perspective.
Whatever the truth of the matter, we can observe extensive regulations
even in our most libertarian states.  This suggests that we do have a settled
consensus that markets should be subject to minimum standards regulations.
Moreover, the legislative and judicial process are both probably better deci-
sion procedures for setting those minimum standards than are market trans-
actions; these political lawmaking settings are more likely to consider
externalities that are too easily dismissed in the bargaining process, and they
are better suited to settling baseline standards of fair treatment within social
relationships.
I should be clear that I am not making an argument in favor of “pater-
nalism.”  The anti-paternalist argument suggests that regulations prevent the
parties from choosing their own ends and making their own mistakes, and I
am not arguing that lawmakers are better situated than the parties to deter-
mine what their own ends should be.  I am also not arguing that judges and
legislators are likely to know better than the parties what is in their best
interest, nor am I arguing that people should never be allowed to make their
own mistakes.  Rather, I am claiming that the lawmaking setting is better
situated than the marketplace for critical and reflective judgment about the
appropriate minimum standards for economic relationships and social
structures.26
This argument for minimum standards regulations, however, is not a
pro-paternalist argument, but an anti anti-paternalist argument.  I am bor-
rowing this concept from Clifford Geertz who similarly argued against anti-
relativist arguments without intending to support relativism.27  Geertz argued
that “[w]e are being offered a choice of worries.”28  Anti-relativists worry
about becoming unmoored and having no attachment to fundamental values
and fear that this will lead to social disorder.  Their opponents (what Geertz
called “anti anti-relativists”) worry instead that we will be so attached to our
intuitions and presuppositions that we will be unable to step back and criti-
26 The lawmaking setting is also sometimes an appropriate policymaking setting in which
evidence of mistakes the parties are likely to make can be brought to light.  If we know that
most people regret failing to provide for their retirement, this provides a reason to enact Social
Security, forcing people to save so that they are able to achieve their long-term goals.
27 Clifford Geertz, Anti Anti-Relativism, 86 AM.  A NTHROPOLOGIST  263 (1984).
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cize them or to appreciate how other people may think and live differently.
Geertz thought the latter problem far greater than the former.
The debate about paternalism similarly offers us a “choice of worries.”
Anti-paternalists fear that lawmakers will be insufficiently attentive to the
value of negative liberty.  For my part, I do not think this is a great worry in
the United States.  Indeed, the whole of our tradition militates in favor of the
notion of “small government.”  The far greater worry is that we will fail to
give people what they want by authorizing contracting parties to give up
basic rights or to impose externalities on others.
If you believe the rhetoric of our politicians, both left and right, “the
era of big government is over,” and government regulations are inherently
suspect.  Yet if you look at our statute books, you find an entirely different
story: our anti-regulation rhetoric does not match our institutional reality.
Our state and federal statutes create a comprehensive network of regulations
that set minimum standards for contractual relationships—minimum stan-
dards that we take for granted.  One definition of taking something for
granted is “to expect something to be available all the time and forget that
you are lucky to have it.”29  We expect the protections afforded by govern-
ment regulation, but then we complain about big government.  When we
make such complaints, it is evident that we are taking government regulation
for granted; we forget that we are lucky to have it.
The free market model sees regulation as sitting on top of the market,
limiting it, or crushing it.  The minimum standards model, on the other hand,
treats regulation as the foundation on which the market sits, without which it
would sink into the earth.  Freedom of contract works only because we have
built that foundation.  The framework of regulation created by both the com-
mon law of tort and property and by our extensive statutory law is what
allows our contract system to focus more narrowly on the private interests of
the parties.30  Minimum standards regulations define things that we would
like to take for granted.  Some of these things are so fundamental that we
convert them into legal rights.  Many of them are so fundamental that we
forget that we are lucky to have them.
II. MANDATORY RULES AS THE FRAMEWORK OF OUR W AY OF LIFE
My second point is that some of these minimum standards regulations
do more than merely set the rules of the road; rather, they define the con-
tours of our very way of life.
29 The Free Dictionary, http://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/take+for+granted (last visited
Sept. 30, 2006) (taken from Cambridge International Dictionary of Idioms (1998)).
30 At the same time, the common law should not directly contradict our considered politi-
cal judgments about minimum standards; often the common law should be changed to comport
with current views of what those minimum standards are, rather than mechanically deferring to
the judgments of those who made common law rules a hundred years ago, when social values
and conditions were very different.\\server05\productn\H\HLP\2-1\HLP209.txt unknown Seq: 13 25-JAN-08 10:46
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I grew up in Monmouth County near the Jersey shore.  The county seat
is called Freehold.  It is an important town because it is where Bruce Spring-
steen went to high school.  But that is not the only reason; with the name
Freehold, those of you who know property law will not be surprised to learn
that there is a story behind that name and the story has something to do with
property.
On March 12, 1664, King Charles II gave all the land between the Del-
aware and Connecticut rivers to his brother James, Duke of York.  Two
months later, the Duke of York sent his friend Richard Nicholls to seize this
territory from the Dutch.  Nicholls beat the Dutch and then gave several
groups of settlers deeds to two tracts of land in New Jersey.  One of those
groups settled in Monmouth County.  Unfortunately, Nicholls may not have
had the legal authority to grant titles to these lands.  In fact, the Duke of
York subsequently granted all of New Jersey to two men, Lord John Berke-
ley and Sir George Carteret, who hoped to establish feudalism and become
the lords of New Jersey; they would live off the rents paid to them by their
loyal tenants.
The settlers, however, refused to acknowledge Berkeley and Carteret as
their feudal lords.  They had read something by this fellow named John
Locke, and they argued that they had freehold title to their lands based on
their labor and owed no tribute to any lord.  They also claimed that they had
prior valid titles from Nicholls—first in time, first in right.  The settlers fur-
ther claimed that they had no duty to pay quit-rents to the new lords of New
Jersey even though their deeds contained promises that they would make
such payments.  They argued that they had freehold title to their lands (“fee
simple” ownership) and that ownership of land was incompatible with any
reserved rental rights in the grantor; later generations of lawyers would ar-
gue that any duty to pay quit-rents would be “repugnant to the fee.”  The
freeholders’ refusal to pay quit-rents started a low-level civil war that raged
in New Jersey for about a hundred years, from about 1650 to 1750.31  The
successors to the lords were called the “proprietors” and they kept trying to
get the freeholders to pay them quit-rents.  But the freeholders just as stub-
bornly resisted, and, in the end, the freeholders prevailed—hence, the name
of the county seat and, to a degree, life as we know it.32
This contest between the “proprietors” and the “freeholders” was
partly a contest over the legitimate source of title to land, but it was more
31 BRENDAN M CCONVILLE, THOSE D ARING D ISTURBERS OF THE P UBLIC P EACE: THE
STRUGGLE FOR PROPERTY AND POWER IN EARLY NEW JERSEY (Cornell Univ. Press 1999).
32 It is an uncomfortable paradox that we had to ignore the vested property rights of the
lords of New Jersey to end up with a private property system that had many owners who were
free of feudal obligations to aristocratic families. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S.
229 (1984) (land reform act to redistribute title from landlords to tenants satisfies “public use”
requirement of the Takings Clause).  An even more painful truth is that the freehold titles we
cherish were created by denying freehold title to Indian nations and forcibly occupying their
land or coercing them to enter treaties with the United States by which they relinquished their
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fundamentally a contest over a way of life.  The question was whether New
Jersey would become a feudal demesne with two lords and many tenants
bound to them by personal and inheritable obligations and governors chosen
by the two lords, or a property-owning democracy with many owners and a
government chosen with the consent of the governed.  Either system would
constitute both a form of property and a form of regulation.  Moreover, both
forms restrict freedom of action to promote a particular sort of social order.
But our nation had to choose between these models of social life, and it
picked the form that enhances the chances of more people to be free and
equal persons able to control their own destinies on their own land.  Over
two centuries ago, the freeholders prevailed, setting the framework for how
we define property rights today—and for our way of life.
III. THE MYOPIA OF THE FREE MARKET MODEL
My third point is that our way of life is not adequately captured by the
idea of the “free market.”  Instead, our conception of the free market is
embedded in a larger and more fundamental conception, which I will call the
idea of a “free and democratic society.”  Consider the New Jersey case of
State v. Shack, with which I start my property class.33  There, a farm owner
hires migrant workers to harvest his crops.  When a doctor and a lawyer
enter the farm to provide professional services to the workers living there,
the owner confronts them with a gun and refuses to let them visit the work-
ers unless they do it in the owner’s office under his watchful and protective
eye.  The lawyer objects, the owner calls the police, and the doctor and the
lawyer are both arrested for trespass.
It seems like an open and shut case—the doctor and lawyer certainly
seem to be trespassing.  They are on the owner’s land without his consent.
And the workers’ employment contract certainly contains no right to receive
visitors in the barracks where they are housed.  But the New Jersey Supreme
Court was uninterested in the agreed-upon terms of the contract.  Instead, the
court sought a “fair adjustment of the competing needs of the parties, in
light of the realities of [their] relationship.”34  Rather than asking whether
the contract was voluntary and what its terms were, the court asserted that
certain “rights are too fundamental to be denied” merely because the con-
tract fails to provide for them.35  The court said:
[W]e find it unthinkable that the farmer-employer can assert
a right to isolate the worker in any respect significant for the
worker’s well-being.  The farmer, of course, is entitled to pursue
his farming activities without interference. . . . So, too, the migrant
33 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971).
34 Id. at 374.
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worker must be allowed to receive visitors there of his own choice,
. . . and members of the press may not be denied reasonable access
to workers who do not object to seeing them. . . .
[T]he employer may not deny the worker his privacy or in-
terfere with his opportunity to live with dignity and to enjoy as-
sociations customary among our citizens.  These rights are too
fundamental to be denied on the basis of an interest in real prop-
erty and too fragile to be left to the unequal bargaining strength of
the parties.36
From the standpoint of free market ideology, this all seems to represent
the heavy hand of paternalistic regulation by an activist court: the judges
think they know better than the workers what is in their best interest.
But there is something quite odd, if not disingenuous, about framing the
problem in that way: the free market model asks us to choose between free-
dom of contract and regulation, between self-determination and paternalism,
between autonomy and Big Brother—but, as the legal realists kept trying to
teach us, these dichotomies are misleading.  That description makes it appear
as if we are choosing between good things (like freedom, self-determination,
and autonomy) and bad things (like regulation, paternalism, and Big
Brother).  This choice structure fails to acknowledge that anything bad
comes from deregulation or that anything good comes from regulation.
Moreover, it suggests that freedom always increases when regulation
decreases.
Yet we know that bargaining takes place in the context of a particular
property system, an existing distribution of property, a set of market regula-
tions, and a detailed legal structure.  If we really wanted to make the choice
one of deregulation versus regulation, we would start with no rules at all.
That would make it a choice between anarchy and government, between the
war of all against all and the rule of law.  But this would be an easy choice—
no one wants to live in a society without the rule of law.  The truth of the
matter is that we are not starting from a standpoint of deregulation; we are
starting from a regulatory structure.   We are not choosing whether to regu-
late; the real issue is what regulations we should have.  In other words, what
we really want to know is: What background rules will govern interactions
in the marketplace?
In the bargaining process, landlords and tenants have the right to de-
mand various things from each other; however, the framework of a free and
democratic society requires some demands to be taken off the table.  Some
demands are out of line.  Tenants have the right not to be asked certain
things, like relinquishing the right to receive visitors.  Similarly, according
to the Supreme Court of New Jersey, the farm owner cannot legitimately
demand that his workers relinquish the right to receive government services
36 Id. at 374–75.\\server05\productn\H\HLP\2-1\HLP209.txt unknown Seq: 16 25-JAN-08 10:46
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meant for their benefit.  These are minimum standards for the contractual
relationship.
Chief Justice Weintraub’s opinion argued that “‘no trespass’ signs re-
present the last dying remnants of paternalistic behavior.”37  That terminol-
ogy is confusing.  When we talk about paternalism today, we usually think
about government rules that limit what contracts we can enter into; because
we think we know better than the government what is in our best interest, we
think it is paternalistic for the government to regulate the terms of our con-
tracts.  Here the court argued that it would be paternalistic not to regulate the
contract.  How could that be?
The answer is that the court was thinking about an older form of pater-
nalism, one that is very familiar to property lawyers: the paternalism of the
plantation or the feudal manor where the lord treated everyone in his de-
mesne as part of his family under his autocratic control.  The farm owner in
State v. Shack wanted to act like a lord—he wanted to control his workers’
private lives; he wanted to be a master and to treat his workers like servants.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey said no, holding that some preferences
should not be indulged.  Our legal system does not, in fact, seek to satisfy all
preferences whatever they happen to be.  A free market is not a feudal soci-
ety; it is not a slave society; it is not an apartheid society; it is not a caste
society; and it is not a company town.  The “free market” describes a partic-
ular sort of social order,38 and that order is premised not only on freedom of
contract but on the equal status of persons.   This means that the liberty of
each party to the deal must be limited in certain ways to protect the liberty of
the other.
Nor does this principle apply only to protect the interests of the poor or
the vulnerable.  In another well-known case that changed the law of prop-
erty, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that landlords have a duty to miti-
gate damages when tenants seek to leave before the end of the lease term.39
Since Sommer v. Kridel was decided in 1977, all but a few states have now
followed New Jersey’s lead and adopted this rule.  Consider a law student in
Cambridge who wants to take a summer job in New York City but has
signed a yearlong lease in Cambridge that began the previous September 1st.
The lease prohibits subletting.  The student wants to break the lease or sublet
the apartment for June, July, and August; she finds a potential subtenant for
the Cambridge apartment and seeks the landlord’s consent to sublet so she
can take the summer job in New York.  If there is no duty to mitigate dam-
ages, the landlord can refuse and insist that the original tenant pay the rent as
it comes due over the summer; if the tenant fails to pay the rent when due,
the landlord can wait until the end of the summer and sue the student for the
unpaid summer rent.  This traditional rule would allow the landlord to insist
37 Id. at 373.
38 See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND P ROPRIETY: COMPETING V ISIONS OF
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776–1970 (1997).
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that this student remain in Cambridge over the summer or suffer the obliga-
tion to pay two rents—one in Cambridge and one in New York.  Economists
tell us this is inefficient.  A duty to mitigate damages induces the landlord
either to accept the proposed sublet or look for a replacement tenant herself.
This obligation would protect the market value of the leasehold to the land-
lord while benefiting the original tenant, the subletter, and the New York
employer.  Of course, we could leave the landlord and tenant to bargain
about all this, but the fear is that transaction costs may block an efficient
deal.
But property law suggests an entirely different reason for imposing a
duty to mitigate damages—a reason that does not adopt a paternalistic atti-
tude toward the poor: allowing the landlord to demand that the tenant either
stay in Cambridge or pay double rents may have the effect of tying the ten-
ant to the land.  The landlord has no legitimate interest in controlling the
tenant’s life in this way.  The landlord’s only legitimate interest is in the
payment of the agreed-upon rent, and the mitigation rule protects that eco-
nomic interest sufficiently while also protecting the tenant’s strong personal
interest in taking the New York job.   Giving the landlord the freedom to
ignore the tenant’s interest in moving to another city gives the landlord too
much power and constrains the tenant’s liberty too much.  The landlord is
acting a little too much like a feudal lord.  This is an example of a case in
which negative liberty, a decent society, and efficiency all appear to coin-
cide.  But the fact of the matter is that this is not always the case, and when
we face conflicts among our core normative commitments, we must make
choices.
Here is a final example from New Jersey.  A homeowner in Twin Riv-
ers, New Jersey, wanted to put up a political sign in her front yard, but the
homeowners’ association that governed her property had a rule that prohib-
ited all signs, including political signs supporting candidates for office.  The
homeowners’ association had argued for freedom of contract.  Those who
bought homes in the area had agreed to be bound by whatever rules the
association adopted, and it was not irrational for the members of the associa-
tion to want to live in a residential environment free of signs, political or
otherwise.  But the New Jersey appeals court rejected these arguments, strik-
ing down the rule as unenforceable.40  The court applied New Jersey’s expan-
sive state constitutional protections for free speech and ruled that property
owners subject to regulation by homeowners’ associations have the same
rights as other homeowners to put up signs supporting candidates for office
and other public causes.41  More than 40 million people live in homes regu-
lated by homeowners’ associations, and the court argued that failing to ex-
40 Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners’ Ass’n, 890 A.2d 947 (N.J.
Super. Ct.   App. Div. 2006), rev’d, 929 A.2d 1060 (N.J. 2007).
41 The First Amendment protects the right to put political signs on your own property.
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (holding that a city cannot enforce ordinance that
unreasonably banned all signs on residential property).\\server05\productn\H\HLP\2-1\HLP209.txt unknown Seq: 18 25-JAN-08 10:46
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tend free speech rights to these owners would undermine the constitutive
role of those rights in our democratic society.
The appellate court in the Twin Rivers case based its ruling on New
Jersey’s unusual state constitutional free speech rights.  The Supreme Court
of New Jersey reversed on appeal, adopting the more narrow conception
prevalent elsewhere in the United States.42  However, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey emphasized that its ruling did not mean that the same result
could not have been reached through application of common law principles
or statutory provisions that prohibit enforcement of condominium rules that
are unreasonable.43  Those alternate sources of law provide a powerful basis
for the appellate court’s ruling.  For example, the Restatement (Third) of
Property on Servitudes, published in 2000, abolishes technical doctrines that
inhibit the creation of arguably desirable land use restrictions.  The Third
Restatement thus increases freedom of contract by allowing owners to create
whatever land use restrictions they want.  At the same time, it prohibits these
restrictions from running with the land to bind future owners of the property
if the restrictions are unreasonable or if they violate a long list of public
policies—like protection for individual interests in free speech and privacy,
or social interests in the reasonable development of land.44  The Third Re-
statement thus increases both the realm of freedom of contract and the realm
of regulation.  Why does the Third Restatement temper this new spirit of
freedom of contract by introducing new regulatory options?  It does so be-
cause property lawyers are acutely aware of the ways in which property
rights shape social life.  They are also acutely aware of the need to limit
freedom of contract to protect the rights of owners.
The Twin Rivers court understood that negative externalities flow from
legally restricting homeowners’ ability to participate in the democratic pro-
cess by putting up signs on their lawns.  What mattered to the court was not
just satisfying the preferences of consumers or increasing the market value
of land, but the effect of property law on our way of life and our most
fundamental values.  The court constructed property law in a manner that
attended to its role in creating the legal framework for a free and democratic
society.
Here and in the other cases I have noted, the courts may or may not be
right in their results, but they are absolutely right that both contract and
property rights have externalities and that some of these externalities affect
the basic structure of society.  The courts are also right in holding that eco-
nomic relationships must meet certain minimum standards that help set the
ground rules of a free and democratic society.   Law shapes social relations,
and to avoid unjust and oppressive power relationships, it must rule certain
kinds of contractual arrangements as out of bounds.
42 Committee for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners’ Ass’n., 929 A.2d
1060 (N.J. 2007).
43 Id. at 1074–75.
44 Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 3.1 cmt.h (2000).\\server05\productn\H\HLP\2-1\HLP209.txt unknown Seq: 19 25-JAN-08 10:46
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And the notion that contracts are subject to minimum standards regula-
tions is not solely a liberal one.  Consider the Freedom to Display the Ameri-
can Flag Act of 2005, passed July 24, 2006, which guarantees the right to fly
the American flag on one’s property, regardless of any condominium or
homeowners’ association rule or covenant to the contrary.45  The statute ef-
fectively nullifies any real covenant or condominium rule to the contrary by
providing that no homeowners’ association may enforce any rule restricting
an owner from displaying the American flag.  This law interferes with free-
dom of contract and takes away vested property rights from homeowners’
associations that had created such restrictions when owners invested in reli-
ance on their ability to control the external appearance of neighboring units
subject to the agreed-upon land use restrictions.
When we ask “why interfere with freedom of contract?” we pretend
that any and all contractual relationships can be respected in a free and dem-
ocratic society. But we know this is not the case.  If we recognize the contri-
bution that law makes to liberty, we will recognize that all contracts are
subject to minimum standards regulations that take certain contract terms off
the table.  So when we deliberate over injecting a mandatory term into a
contract, we should be asking a different question: “What are the minimum
standards for transactions like this”?
To answer this question, we should acknowledge that our concept of the
free market is embedded in a larger conception of the free and democratic
society.  We will misunderstand the free market if we do not see it as situ-
ated in this larger political setting.  The abolition of feudalism, the eradica-
tion of slavery and racial segregation, the promotion of equal rights for
women, and the protection of the rights of consumers all represent funda-
mental changes in social and legal structures within which market relations
occur.  We are not merely concerned with rules of the road, nor is our only
goal the satisfaction of human wants.  We are—or we should be—interested
in whether the terms of a given contract violate minimum standards of de-
cency.  Are they consistent with the minimum standards governing the legal
framework of a free and democratic society that treats each person with
equal concern and respect?
This is a hard question.  It cannot be answered definitively by reference
to precedent, efficiency, or tradition.  How do we answer it?
45 Pub. L. 109-243, 120 Stat. 572 Codified as 4 U.S.C. § 5.   The statute provides, at §3:
A condominium association, cooperative association, or residential real estate man-
agement association may not adopt or enforce any policy, or enter into any agree-
ment, that would restrict or prevent a member of the association from displaying the
flag of the United States on residential property within the association with respect
to which such member has a separate ownership interest or a right to exclusive pos-
session or use.
Section 4 of the statute contains an exception for “any reasonable restriction pertaining to the
time, place, or manner of displaying the flag of the United States necessary to protect a sub-
stantial interest of the condominium association, cooperative association, or residential real
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Creating the legal framework of a free and democratic society requires
us to do more than just satisfy human preferences, whatever they happen to
be.  Some preferences cannot be indulged; before we can balance interests,
we must distinguish legitimate from illegitimate interests.  To do this, we
must attend to social context; although the right to exclude others from your
dinner party may be close to absolute, your right to exclude customers from
your restaurant is limited by antidiscrimination laws.  Deciding when inter-
ests become moral claims—and when moral claims become legal claims—
requires considered judgment about our most fundamental values; it requires
us to define the contours of the good society.  Yet we live in a society char-
acterized by deep divisions on fundamental values.  This means that we need
to combine normative commitment with respect for difference—not exactly
the easiest thing to accomplish.46
At Harvard Law School we have a course on analytical methods for
lawyers.  We may need to develop a parallel set of techniques of normative
methods for lawyers. Lawyers use a variety of normative techniques that
help us to come to conclusions about what we believe is just and fair in a
multicultural society; moreover, the process of justifying legal outcomes to
others has a very significant constraining effect on these normative
choices.47  Building the legal framework of a free and democratic society
requires us to supplement legal and economic theory with the resources
found in certain forms of both Kantian and pragmatist moral and political
theory.  The core claim of this theory, according to Christine Korsgaard, is
that we have an obligation to justify our actions by reasons that others could
accept.48  Tim Scanlon reverses the formulation, suggesting we are obligated
to give reasons that others could not reasonably reject.49  Normative argu-
ment is based on the idea that people are of immeasurable importance and
that they deserve to be treated like human beings, not merely as cogs in a
wealth-producing machine—in Kant’s words, as ends, not means.50  This
claim is also based on the tradition associated both with the Golden Rule and
with social contract theory: we cannot legitimately make claims for our-
selves while denying those same claims to others.   Pragmatists like Eric
McGillvray similarly suggest that “justification of a given end depends not
on our ability to identify indubitable first principles that support it but rather
46 See Amy Gutmann, Preface and Acknowledgements, in CHARLES TAYLOR, K. ANTHONY
APPIAH, J ¨ URGEN HABERMAS, STEVEN C. ROCKEFELLER, MICHAEL W ALZER & SUSAN W OLF,
MULTICULTURALISM xiii (Amy Gutmann ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1994)(“Can people who
differ in their moral perspectives nonetheless reason together in ways that are productive of
greater ethical understanding?”).
47 See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SI` ECLE) (Harvard Univ.
Press 1998) (1997).
48 See CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD,  ET AL., THE S OURCES OF N ORMATIVITY (Cambridge
Univ. Press 1996).
49 T.M. SCANLON, WHAT W E O WE TO E ACH O THER (Belknap Press of Harvard Univ.
Press 1998).
50 IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 41 (Mary Gregor
trans., ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997)(1785). See also MARK TIMMONS, MORAL THEORY:
AN INTRODUCTION 157 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2002).\\server05\productn\H\HLP\2-1\HLP209.txt unknown Seq: 21 25-JAN-08 10:46
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on our ability to persuade others to act upon one set of uncertain beliefs
rather than another.”51
Economists have taught us to ask: “What contract would the parties
have made if they had perfect information?”  This question is consistent
with a certain form of libertarian political philosophy, as interpreted through
the lens of utilitarianism.52  But more egalitarian-minded political philoso-
phers have taught us a different set of questions.  John Rawls might ask:
“What would the contract have said if the parties did not know on which
side of the bargaining table they would be sitting?”  When we ask the Rawl-
sian question, it is possible we will conclude that a particular contract term
does violate minimum standards of a free and democratic society.  And
when that happens, our questions may become more pointed and confronta-
tional.  Instead of asking: “What are the minimum standards for this kind of
transaction?” we might find ourselves asking: “What gives you the right to
treat your workers so badly?”  Or perhaps even: “Would you want your son
or your daughter to work under conditions like this?”
We do not ask these questions because we want the courts or legisla-
tures writing the details of every contract.  We ask them because people have
obligations as well as rights.53  We ask them because some preferences can-
not be indulged and some demands are out of line.   We ask them because
minimum standards regulations do more than set the rules of the road; they
construct the framework of a free and democratic society that treats each
person with equal concern and respect.  We will debate what those minimum
standards are and how to best achieve them.   But that is a debate I am
willing to have.
51 ERIC MACGILVRAY, RECONTRUCTING PUBLIC REASON 155 (Harvard Univ. Press 2004).
52 The question assumes the existing distribution of wealth between the parties and society
as a whole and equates what people are “willing and able to pay” with “what they prefer”—a
highly controversial assumption that denies equal status to persons by allowing bargaining
power to be allocated on the basis of property distributions that do not necessarily have just
origins.
53 See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY (Yale Univ.
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